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I. Subpoenaing the President: Jefferson v. Marshall in the Burr Case
We do not think that the President is exalted above legal process
.. .and if the President possesses information of any nature
which might tend to serve the cause of Aaron Burr, a subpoena
should issue to him, notwithstanding his elevated station.
Alexander McRae, of counsel
for President Jefferson'
Chief Justice Marshall's rulings on President Jefferson's claim of
right to withhold information in the trial of Aaron Burr have been
a source of perennial debate. Eminent writers have drawn demon-
strably erroneous deductions from the record. For example, Edward
t Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard University
Law School.
1. 1 T. CARPENTER, THE TRIAL OF COLONEL AARON BURR 75 (1807). McRae's co-counsel,
William Wirt, who served as Attorney General of the United States for twelve consecu-
tive years, stated that "if the production of this letter would not compromit [sic]
the safety of the United States, and it can be proved to be material to Mr. Burr, he
has a right to demand it. Nay, in such a case, I will admit his right to summon the
President ... ." Id. at 82. His associate, George Hay, the United States Attorney, stated,
I never had the idea of clothing the President . . . with those attributes of di-
vinity. . . . That high officer is but a man; he is but a citizen; and, if he
knows anything in any case, civil or criminal, which might affect the life, liberty
or property of his fellow-citizens . . . it is his duty to . . . go before a Court,
and declare what he knows. And what would be the process, in case he failed to
attend? Why, the common means would be, for the Court to issue an attachment
to force him ....
Id. at 90-91.
Later Wirt, arguing in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), stated:
Shall we be asked . .. how this Court will enforce its injunction. . . . I answer,
it will be time enough to meet that question when it shall arise. . . . In a land
of laws, the presumption is that the decision of the Courts will be respected; and,
in case they should not, it is a poor government indeed in which there does
not exist power to enforce respect.
What is the value of that government in which the decrees of its Courts can
be mocked at and defied with impunity? . . . It is no government at all. ...
[This Court is not] to anticipate that the President will not do his duty.
2 C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 207-08 (1922). Although this was
uttered against a background of veiled presidential threats not to enforce a decree
against Georgia, the reasoning extends to a subpoena against the President. Id. at 205.
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Corwin stated that Jefferson "refuse[d] to respond to Chief Justice
Marshall's subpoena," 2 a statement recently repeated by Circuit Judge
George MacKinnon. 3 More recently still, Irwin S. Rhodes, on the
basis of "newly discovered" evidence, 4 has charged that Chief Judge
John J. Sirica, "by asserting the right of the court to order presiden-
tial submission and to review and revise the president's judgment in
the exercise of executive privilege," laid claim to "a power that Chief
Justice Marshall disavowed." In following him, Rhodes states, the
Court of Appeals, which "limited or opposed the absolute character
of presidential privilege departed from the rulings of Chief Justice
Marshall . . . ."5 And he concludes that insofar as the courts "depart
from precedent under assertions of perpetuating it, the law as well
as history is not well served."6
This is a ringing condemnation, and I may be indulged for being
equally blunt: The courts were right and Rhodes is wrong. With the
"tapes" issue threatening to boil up anew in consequence of President
Nixon's refusal to furnish further information to Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski, and the even more serious limits set by the President
on "cooperation" with the impeachment investigation by the House
Judiciary Committee, 7 the issue posed by Rhodes is of greatest im-
portance. It is high time that the issue be removed from the realm
of opinion, that the Burr record be permitted to speak for itself, and
that the several Marshall pronouncements be set out so that one may
judge where the truth lies.
As Rhodes remarks, "the proceedings were in four stages: commit-
ment during the grand jury inquiry, trial and acquittal on a charge
of treason, trial and acquittal on a charge of misdemeanor, commit-
ment to the United States Circuit Court of Ohio on a misdemeanor
charge."S The "new" evidence upon which Rhodes relies comes from
the fourth stage; and he notices that Marshall
2. E. CoRwIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 139 (3d ed. 1948). Compare the
statement by Dumas Malone at p. 1119 infra.
3. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion) ("the
President, through his attorney, refused to disclose certain passages").
4. Rhodes, What Really Happened to the Jefferson Subpoenas, 60 A.B.A.J. 52 (1974).
He alleges that the courts relied on the "incomplete record." They "failed to uncover
the complete contemporaneous reporting of the case taken in shorthand by Thomas
Carpenter . . ." and to consult the archives wherein he located a copy "of the con-
troversial letter of General Wilkinson to Presidnt Jefferson . I..." d.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 54.
7. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974, at 1, col. 8; Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1974, at 7, col. 2.
8. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 52.
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recognized that if Burr could prove the relevancy of the material
withheld and if the proceedings were a prosecution in chief [in-
stead of commitment proceedings], he might discontinue the
case.0
Apparently Rhodes did not realize that this statement demolished his
argument.
In the preliminary first stage proceedings, Burr sought to procure
a letter of October 21, 180[6], written by General Wilkinson to
Jefferson, by means of a subpoena calling both for Jefferson's at-
tendance and production of the letter,10 though Burr repeatedly
stated that he was content merely to obtain the letter."' Alexander
McRae, of counsel for Jefferson, "admitted that the President might
be summoned to attend,"'12 an admission to which Marshall later
adverted,' 3 but George Hay, the United States Attorney, disputed
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.14 Because Marshall fully appre-
ciated the importance of the personal summons, he was not content
to rest on the concession of counsel but rendered a written opinion
on June 13, 1807, in which he concluded that "any person charged
with a crime in the courts of the United States, has a right before, as
well as after indictment, to the process of the Court, to compel the
attendance of his witnesses."'"
Turning to the subpoena duces tecum Marshall stated: "In the
provisions of the Constitution and of the statute which give to the
accused a right to the compulsory process of the Court there is no
exception whatever." Likening the President to the Governor of a
State, he observed that "it is not known ever to have been doubted,
that the Chief Magistrate of a State might be served with a subpoena
ad testificandum." He added that "it has never been alledged [sic]"
9. Id. at 54. On the preponderant role of "relevancy," see note 33 infra.
10. 1 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 65. 124.
11. Id. at 62, 64, 70; 2 id. at 4.
12. 1 id. at 77, 84. While Jefferson wrote that personal attendance might hale him
to all parts of the vast hinterland, he stated that if Burr should "suppose there
are any facts within the knowledge of the Heads of departments or of myself ' * *
we shall be ready to give him the benefit of it, by way of deposition . . . " a
plea of inconvenience rather than of lack of jurisdiction. 9 JEFFEPRSox WRITINGS 57 (P.
Ford ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as Ford]. Compare this with Rhodes' statement that
Jefferson wrote Hay on June 17 "denying the right to demand his personal at-
tendance." Rhodes, supra note 4, at 53. No such representation was ever made to
the court. To the contrary, his counsel professed readiness to have him appear. See
note I supra.
13. "We observed that Mr. Hay admitted, that the President might be subpoenaed."
1 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 70.
14. Id. at 84, 127.
15. Id. at 127.
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that in England "a subpoena might not be directed" to members of
the "cabinet council," who, instead of the King, he correctly noted,
were the analogue of the American executive. 16 Marshall could "per-
ceive no legal objection to issuing a subpoena duces tecum, to any
person whatever, provided the case be such as to justify the process.""
If the papers "may be important in the evidence-if they may be
safely read at the trial-would it not be a blot in the page which re-
cords the judicial proceedings of this country, that, in a case of such
serious import as this, the accused should be denied the use of
them?"'
8
Marshall then addressed the argument that "the letter contains
matter which ought not to be disclosed;" he said, "There is certainly
nothing before the Court, which shews, that the letter in question
contains any matter, the disclosure of which, would endanger the pub-
lic safety. If it does contain any matter which it would be imprudent
to disclose, which it is not the wish of the Executive to disclose, such
matter, if it be not immediately and essentially applicable to the point,
will of course, be suppressed." 19 As further developments indicate,
Marshall was not to waver from this view. Should Burr be found
guilty, he added, all concerned "should certainly regret that a paper
which the accused believed to be essential to his defence ... had been
withheld from him;" and "it would justly tarnish the reputation of the
Court which had given its sanction to its being withheld." Sounding
a personal note, Marshall went on to say that he would feel "self-
reproach" were he to "declare on the information now possessed, that
the accused is not entitled to the letter in question, if it should be
really important to him. '20
In sum, Marshall made the touchstone of nondisclosure danger to
the public safety, not "confidentiality," as President Nixon urges; and
even such matter would be sheltered only if it were not "essentially
applicable" to the defense. He regarded a judicial sanction to with-
hold such "essential" information as a "blot" which would "tarnish
the reputation of the Court."
Corwin's statement that Jefferson "refuse[d] to respond to Chief
16. Id. at 127-28. Marshall rejected the reservation in the law of evidence for the
King-which was based on the ground that it was "incompatible with his dignity to
appear under the process of the court"-because the "principle of the English con-
stitution that the king can do no wrong" was inapplicable to our government where-
under "the President .. .may be impeached and may be removed from office." Id.
17. Id. at 129.
18. Id. at 180.
19. Id. at 133.
20. Id. at 134.
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Justice Marshall's subpoena" is also inaccurate. On June 12 Jefferson
wrote to Hay that he had delivered the papers to the Attorney Gen-
eral and instructed the War Department to review its files with a
view to compliance with the subpoena.2 1 In a second letter to Hay on
June 17, Jefferson wrote that "the receipt of these papers [by Hay]
has, I presume, so far anticipated, and others this day forwarded will
have substantially fulfilled the object of a subpoena .... *22 When
Jefferson learned that the Attorney General did not have the Wilkin-
son letter subpoenaed by Burr, he wrote Hay on June 23 that "[N]o
researches shall be spared to recover this letter, & if recovered, it shall
immediately be sent on to you. '2 3 Hay advised the court that "[Wjhen
we receive general Wilkinson's letter, the return will be completed. '24
This is hardly a "refusal" to comply with the subpoena. Apparently
the letter "had been put in the hands of the clerk."
25
( The treason trial commenced on August 3 and on September 1
Burr was acquitted.2 6 On September 2 the misdemeanor proceedings
commenced and on September 3 Burr called for a second letter from
Wilkinson to Jefferson, dated November 12, 1806.27 Hay replied that
the letter contained "several strictures upon certain characters in the
Western country .... Would it not be better, to trust the Court with
the selection of such parts, as it might deem necessary to the defence
of the accused?" Luther Martin objected to a "secret tribunal," where-
upon Hay proposed to "submit those letters to the inspection of either
Mr. Randolph, or Mr. Botts, or Mr. Wickham [Burr counsel]; the
man so selected, to pledge himself upon honour, not to divulge the
confidential contents. If there was any difference of opinion as to
what were confidential passages, the Court were to decide."' 28 Burr's
counsel insisted that Burr too should see the letter and demanded
production in "public. '29 This is worlds apart from the Nixon claim
21. Ford, supra note 12, at 55-56.
22. Id. at 56.
23. Id. at 61.
24. 1 D. ROBERTSON, TRIAL OF AARON BURR 256 (1808). Like the Carpenter report,
the Robertson report is a stenographic record of the trial.
25. 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 14. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 53, states that
"a copy of the letter of October 21, which had been lost, [wasJ submitted."
26. 2 T. CARPENTER, supra note I, at 3; 3 id. at 3.
27. 3 id. at 9, 20, 21.
28. Id. at 20.
29. Id. Robertson reports that Martin also claimed the right to hear the Wilkinson
letter "publicly," 2 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 502, and that Hay said, "I wish
the court to look at the letter and say whether it does not contain what ought not
to be submitted to public inspection." Id. at 509. It "cannot be right," said Hay,
that Burr "shall have . . . access to the letter, merely for the purpose of making it
public." 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 25. In his opinion of September 4, Marshall
took account of this dispute; he said,
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of blanket "confidentiality," of a right to withhold from court as well
as counsel. Instead, Hay left the final determination to the court.
What were the "strictures" Jefferson's counsel were so zealous to
shield? Rhodes, who apparently consulted true copies of the letter in
the archives, states that Wilkinson referred to the "complicity of Gov-
ernor Claiborne of Louisiana and his secretary, Cowles Meade, in the
[Burr] conspiracy. Claiborne was a trusted appointee of Jefferson, who
was adamant that the charges against Claiborne and his aide not be
made public."30 Since Wilkinson was to testify against Burr, this
attempted suppression is not the most glorious chapter in Jefferson's
history. A subpoena issued on September 4 and Hay promptly made a
return with a copy of the letter;
excepting such parts thereof as are, in my opinion, not material
for the purposes of justice, for the defence of the accused, or per-
tinent to the issue.... The accuracy of this opinion, I am willing
to refer to the judgment of the Court, by submitting the original
letter for its inspection. 31
Earlier, on June 12, Jefferson had devolved on Hay "the exercise
of that discretion, which it would be my right and duty to exercise
by withholding ... any parts of the letter, which are not directly ma-
terial for the purposes of justice."3 2 Neither Jefferson nor Hay invoked
an absolute claim of right to withhold information from the court.
They restricted themselves to matters irrelevant to the cause and Hay
was willing to leave the judgment on relevancy to the Court.33 Burr's
counsel, Botts, then moved that the "prosecution should stand, and be
continued until that letter shall be in the possession of your Clerk.
' ' 34
On this state of facts Marshall delivered a second opinion on Sep-
tember 4. Rhodes asserts that rather than review "the withheld data
in camera or otherwise and weighing relevant interests," Marshall
With respect to the secrecy of these parts which it is stated are improper to
give out to the world, the Court will take any order that may be necessary. I do
not think that the accused ought to be prohibited from seeing the letter: but
I will order that no copy of it be taken for public exhibition; and that no
use shall be made of it but what is necessarily attached to the case . . . . [I]f it
is necessary to debate it in public, those who take notes may be instructed not
to insert any part of the arguments on that subject.
Id. at 38.
30. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 52, 53.
31. 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 27-28.
32. 1 id. at 10 (second series of pagination).
33. Throughout, "relevancy" was the touchstone. See pp. 1114, 1118 supra, text ac-
companying notes 32-33, pp. 1120-21 infra, and note 37 infra.
34. 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 30.
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"repeatedly sidestepped or ignored suggestions by one or the other
of the parties to examine the letter and determine the validity of the
president's assertion." 5 Rhodes bases his argument on Marshall's state-
ment, "I never ought to have heard it at all, and which I must treat
as though I have never heard. I cannot, therefor, speak from any
knowledge I have of the letter."3 6 The reason for this statement,
which escaped Rhodes, was in Marshall's own words that "it is im-
possible that either the Court or the attorney [for the President] can
know in what manner it is meant to be used: I must, therefore, con-
sider declaration made upon that subject, as though they had not been
made."'37 In other words Marshall sought to determine a broad issue
of law, divorced from his premature and incomplete knowledge of the
facts, which he broadly hinted did not really demand nondisclosure.38
Marshall emphasized that only the defendant knew what was essen-
tial to his case and refused to take from him the right of making that
decision.
Marshall phrased the issue in broadest terms: "If then the executive
possesses a paper which is really believed by the accused to be material
to his defence, ought it to be withheld?"3 9
That the President... might be subpoenaed and examined as a
witness, and called upon to produce any paper which is in his
possession, is not controverted, indeed that has once been decided.
... I can very readily conceive, that the President might receive
a letter which it would be very improper to require for public
exhibition, because of the manifest inconvenience of the ex-
posure. There ought, in such a case, to be an extremely strong
occasion for its demand 40 . . . . I do think that a privilege does
exist with respect to a private letter of the President ['which
might relate to public concerns' 41]
35. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 54. There is, however, no evidence that Burr's counsel
at any point suggested that "relevancy" be left to Marshall.
36. Id.
37. 3 T. CARPEnR, supra note 1, at 37. Marshall subsequently repeated that "it
was impossible for him to determine, even if he saw the letter, how much of it was
relevant to the present case, because he could not anticipate what ground of defence
would be taken by the accused." Id. at 279-80.
38. It is extremely probable that the letter, or the parts of the letter called for
is [sic] of infinitely less importance, if it should be looked into, than gen-
tlemen suppose; and that the objections . . . would vanish at its production; because
it is probable, that, if it was produced and read, very much of the suspicions now
entertained, would be wiped away ....
Id. at 35.
39. Id. at 36.
40. Robertson reports this as follows: "The occasion for demanding it ought, in
such a case, to be very strong, and to be fully shown to the court before its production
could be insisted on." 2 D. Ro3mRsoN, supra note 24, at 535-36.
41. 3 T. CAPEN-m, supra note 1, at 37.
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.... Now, it is a very serious question, when such letters may be
supposed to contain something very material to the defence of any
individual, that he should not be able to avail himself of the ad-
vantage of it .... [P]erhaps the Court ought to consider . . . the
reasons which induced the President to refuse the paper as a gov-
erning principle to induce them to refuse its exhibition, except
as it shall be made to appear absolutely necessary in the defence. 42
Burr had filed an affidavit that the letter "may be material" to his
defense and Marshall held that since "no sufficient reason is adduced,
except in the affidavit of the accused ... the Court must suppose that
the paper ought to be produced; and if that is refused, the Court must
take the proper means of ordering the continuance of the case until
it is produced. ' 43 He concluded that "I do not think that the accused
ought to be prohibited from seeing the letter."4 4 Thus, although
Marshall attached great weight to presidential representations that a
document should be withheld, he reaffirmed what he had earlier held:
that the needs of the accused were primary.
For the purpose of weighing presidential claims against those needs,
Marshall had said in his September 4 opinion that the President him-
self, not his delegate, must "judge as to his motives for withholding
the letter."45 To meet this requirement, Hay had sent an express let-
ter to Jefferson at Monticello on September 5, and on September 9
he read into the record a certificate from Jefferson (to which was an-
nexed a copy of the Wilkinson November 12 letter) in which Jefferson
recited that he had deleted passages "in no wise material to the pur-
poses of justice, on the charges of treason or misdemeanor .... [T]hey
are on subjects irrelevant to any issue which can arise out of those
charges, and could contribute nothing towards his acquittal or convic-
tion."46 That is all that the reports of the trial contain on the sub-
ject.47 Nothing appears in Carpenter's report to indicate what was
42. Id. at 36-37. The challenge to the sufficiency of Burr's allegation that the letter
"may be material" was thus met by Marshall:
[I]f a paper be in the possession of the opposite party, what statement of its
contents or applicancy can be expected from the person who claims its production,
he not knowing its contents? . .. It has always been thought sufficient to describe
the paper, and identify its general nature and authenticity ....
Id. at 35.
43. Id. at 36-37.
44. Id. at 38.
45. Id. at 37; Rhodes, supra note 4, at 53. Robertson reports, "The propriety of
withholding it must be decided by himself, not by another for him." 2 D. ROBERTSON,
supra note 24, at 536.
46. 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 46.
47. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192-93 (No. 14,694) (C.C. Va. 1807), which
purports to draw on the Carpenter and Robertson reports, states that Hay "presented
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done with the letter; it was not read into the record. Dumas Malone,
biographer of Jefferson, concluded that "[t]he document was accepted
without comment. Thus there was an assertion and a recognition of
a degree of executive privilege"; 48 and Judge MacKinnon likewise
states that Marshall "accepted" the deletions, that they "were not
contested."
40
Such statements overlook the mechanics of litigation. The letter
had been subpoenaed by Burr; thus it would be his counsel who
would introduce, it in evidence. There is no mention of an offer in
evidence of the letter by anyone. Earlier, Luther Martin, answering
an objection ("if this evidence [a letter] came, what would be done
with it?"), replied, "The answer is obvious; that it must be retained
by the court till it is wanted,"5 0 at which point it could be called for
by counsel for the purpose of introduction in evidence. Throughout,
Burr had insisted, and was again to insist, on production of the whole
letter, and there is nothing to show that at this stage he had with-
drawn his objections to deletions. 51 As Marshall stated at another junc-
ture, "the Court are bound to hear the evidence; if there are any ob-
jections made, it will hear them, and decide upon their force."
52 Of
an offer of the letter, or of rulings by Marshall there is not a trace.
Malone and Judge MacKinnon would transform Jefferson's com-
pliance with Marshall's requirement of a personal claim of privilege,
as a preliminary to Marshall's balancing of that claim against Burr's
needs, into Marshall's silent withdrawal of the two careful opinions
he had delivered. It is violent presumption that Marshall, without
apparent reason, suddenly overruled his opinions sub silentio, that
he no longer felt that a denial of a needed document to the ac-
cused would be a "blot" on American judicial proceedings, "tar-
nish the reputation of the Court," and fill Marshall himself with
"self-reproach." Views so deeply felt, so often repeated, are not
a certificate from the President .... " Neither report contains such language. Robertson
does not even record the express letter to Hay from Jefferson. 2 D. ROBERTSON, supra
note 24, at 537.
48. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1973, at 30, col. 5.
49. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
50. 1 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 169. Compare Burr's statement on September
3: "A letter has been demanded from the President ... which has been often promised,
but never produced. I wish to know if that letter is in Court, and whether it cannot
be put into the hands of the clerk." 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 14.
51. See, e.g., 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 30, quoting Botts. Rhodes states that
on "September 16, Burr reasserted his demand for the November 12 letter, saying that
'the court ought to make no question how to proceed on it,' undoubtedly referring to
his prior motion to continue the case." Rhodes, supra note 4, at 54. Marshall had
earlier stated that he would follow that course. See p. 1118 supra. Burr continued
to demand the entire letter. See p. 1120 infra.
52. 2 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 125.
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lightly abandoned. Stronger evidence than Jefferson's mere com-
pliance with Marshall's requirement of a personal presidential claim
of privilege is needed to prove that Marshall silently jettisoned his
two decisions.53 There is none.
Instead, the gloss which Malone and Judge MacKinnon put upon
Hay's production of the letter is further rebutted by subsequent
developments in the case: the Rhodes "discovery." On September 15
Burr was found not guilty on the misdemeanor charges."4 Proceed-
ings for the commitment of Burr for trial in another district where
Burr was present when some overt act occurred then began.5 On Sep-
tember 29 Wilkinson testified that the November 12 letter had
been submitted to the grand jury; the presidential mantle of se-
crecy had been rent. Wickham called for the letter, but Hay stated
that Chief Justice Marshall had remarked that "he could not think
of requiring from General Wilkinson the exhibition of those parts
of the letter which the president was unwilling to disclose."' 6
Rhodes quotes this statement 57 but fails to take into account the
implications of further developments. When Wickham, urging that
the letter had been laid before the grand jury, renewed the de-
mand, Marshall again emphasized relevancy:
[A]fter such a certificate from the president . . . as has been
received, I cannot direct the production of those parts of the
letter, without a sufficient evidence of their being relevant to
the present prosecution.5s
The implication that if the deleted portions were shown to be "rele-
vant" their production would be "directed" repels the inference that
Marshall had earlier "accepted" the deletions.
After further argument Marshall "determined that the correct
course, was to leave the accused all the advantages which he might
derive from the parts actually produced; and to allow him all the
advantages of supposing that the omitted parts related to any par-
ticular point. The accused may avail himself as much of them, as
53. Note Marshall's remark on September 4: "[I]ndeed that has once been decided."
See p. 1117 supra. Later he stated in another context, "I have already decided this
question." 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 284.
54. 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 110.
55. Rhodes adverts to Marshalls ruling "that to constitute treason by acts of war
the principal must be physically present at the place of committing the acts, in this
case at Blannerhasset Island, a requirement the testimony could not meet." Rhodes,
supra note 4, at 54.
56. 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 254.
57. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 54.
58. 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 280-81.
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if they were actually produced."5 9 When Hay objected to Wickham's
deduction that defendant's suppositions should be received as evi-
dence in place of Jefferson's deletions, Marshall responded:
It is certainly fair to supply the omitted parts by supposi-
tions . . . . If this were a trial in chief, I should perhaps think
myself bound to continue the cause, on account of the with-
holding the parts of this paper; and I certainly cannot exclude
the inferences which gentlemen may draw from the omissions.00
This was the last word spoken by Marshall on the subject; it re-
affirmed the earlier opinions that the needs of the accused would
override presidential reasons for withholding. In this less formal
commitment proceeding, Marshall permitted Burr to fill the place
of the deleted parts by suppositions that would be given the force
of evidence.
As Rhodes summarized:
The chief justice placed considerable emphasis on the presi-
dent's assertion of irrelevancy of the parts withheld, stating
that in order to make further demand for the letter Burr must
give "sufficient evidence" of relevancy. He recognized that if
Burr could prove the relevancy of the material withheld and
if the proceedings were a prosecution in chief, he might discon-
tinue the case, but in the absence of that proof and circum-
stances he refused further steps than allowing Burr to make the
most favorable inference of the omitted part.61
That allowance made the letter superfluous. Against this background
Mr. Rhodes' deduction, that "[i]t is eminently clear that President
Jefferson['s] . . . claim to an exclusive exercise of executive privilege,
unreviewed and unreviewable by the courts, was upheld by Chief
Justice Marshall," 02 boggles the mind.
No more tenable is Rhodes' view that the misdemeanor trial "con-
cluded without a definitive ruling on the president's right to with-
hold the letter."' 3 In his September 4 opinion, a reaffirmation of
the principles enunciated in the June 13 opinion, Marshall laid
down the rules of law that should guide counsel and firmly indi-
cated that presidential nondisclosure claims must yield to the real
59. Id. at 281-82.
60. Id. at 284.
61. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 54.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 53.
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needs of the accused. Before applying these rules to the facts, he
required a personal claim of privilege by Jefferson. This was not
the only time that Marshall delineated the applicable legal prin-
ciples for the future guidance of counsel. In an opinion rendered
on September 14 respecting the admissibility of certain testimony,
Marshall laid down the governing rules and added, "Gentlemen
well know how to apply these principles. Should any difficulty occur
in applying them, the particular cases will be brought before the
Court and decided."'6 4 The fact that Marshall had no occasion at
the fourth stage commitment hearing to apply the law to the facts,
because Burr could be richly content to substitute his "suppositions"
for the deleted letter, does not render the opinions of June 13 and
September 4 any less the law of the case.65
The heart of Marshall's opinions was therefore justly summarized
by the Court of Appeals in the "tapes" case: "The court was to
show respect for the President's reason . . . but the ultimate de-
cision remained with the Court."001 If the courts are the "ultimate
interpreters" of the Constitution and can therefore constrain Con-
gress to operate within constitutional bounds, 67 they are no less em-
powered to measure presidential claims of constitutional power. The
"mystique" of the President stops at the courthouse doors.
64. 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 103.
65. See p. 1118 and note 53 supra.
66. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
67. See Powell v. McCorrmack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969).
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II. Must Impeachment Precede Indictment?
A great debate has been raging about whether the President or
Vice President must be impeached before he can be indicted. It
turns on the provisions of Article I, § 3 of the Constitution:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from Office, and disqualification . ..but the
Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to In-
dictment, Trial .... 68
Let us begin with the words themselves; "nevertheless" is defined
as "notwithstanding or in spite of." Consequently § 3 must be un-
derstood to mean that an indictment may be filed "in spite of" a
prior removal or impeachment. It does violence to language to
twist this into a requirement that an impeachment must precede
indictment. The implication of "shall nevertheless be liable" to
indictment is that the given party is already liable, that the words
are merely designed to preserve existing criminal liability rather
than to qualify it.09 It would be unreasonable to attribute to the
Framers an intention to insulate officers from criminal liability by
mere appointment to office; like all men they are responsible un-
der the law.7 0 Thus Solicitor General Robert H. Bork concluded in
a brief designed to demonstrate that Vice President Spiro Agnew
could be indicted before he was impeached: "[A] civil officer could
be both impeached and criminally punished even absent the Article
I, Section 3 proviso." 7' 1
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. It is reported that Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski ad-
%ised the grand jury not to indict President Nixon: "It was researched at the time
and the conclusion was that legal doubt on the question was so substantial that a
move to indict a sitting President would touch off a legal battle of gigantic propor-
tions." N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1974, at 24, col. 1.
When I first studied Article I, § 3, I was engrossed in the separation of the removal
on impeachment from the indictment and unwittingly wrote that "[r]emoval would
enable the government to replace an unfit person with a proper person, leaving 'punish-
mient' to a later and separate proceeding .... ." R. BERGER, IMI'EACHMENT: THE CON-
STITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 79 (1973). At that time the problem whether impeachment must
precede indictment had never crossed my mind; since then my incautious words have
been read to endorse that view. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting); Brief for Appellant at 20, Nixon v. Sirica, supra. I hereby
repudiate such endorsement, for study of the problem has convinced me that § 3 has
no such requirement.
69. See discussion of double jeopardy at pp. 1124-25 infra.
70. "[N]o officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the
officers of government, from the highest to the lowest . . . are bound to obey it."
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). See note 84 infra.
71. Memorandum for the United States at I0n.**, Application of Spiro T. Agnew,
Civil No. 73-965 (D. Md.) (memorandum filed Oct. 5, 1973, concerning the Vice Presi-
dent's claim of constitutional immunity, prepared by Solicitor General Robert H. Bork)
[hereinafter cited as Bork].
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Since Article II, § 4, provides without discrimination for the im.
peachment of the "President, Vice President and all civil officers,"
Mr. Bork's statement should be equally applicable to the President.
Furthermore, after impeachment and removal the President is re-
turned to the body of the citizenry.72 No special dispensation is
required to allow prosecution of a citizen; nor is there a scrap of
evidence that the Framers were minded to clothe an ex-President
in any immunity whatsoever. On the contrary, immunity was denied
to him as President. It follows that the President is criminally
triable while in office, because no special provision is required for
trial of an ex-President. An interpretation of the saving clause that
makes the President triable only after removal from office would
therefore reduce the clause to "mere surplusage,"' 73 unless we adopt
an alternative-that it was designed solely to foreclose the argument
of double jeopardy.
Solicitor General Bork justly concluded, as did Justice Story 140
years ago, 74 that the "sole purpose" of the Article I, § 3 "indict-
ment" proviso "is to preclude the argument that the doctrine of
double jeopardy saves the offender from the second trial."' 5 That
danger arose from the English practice, wherein criminal punish-
ment and removal were wedded in one proceeding; hence it was
the part of caution to ward off an inference that a prior impeach-
ment would constitute a bar to indictment. With Solicitor General
Bork, I would conclude that the "nevertheless . . . subject to in-
dictment" clause was not designed "to establish the sequence of
the two processes, but solely to establish [that a prior conviction upon
impeachment] does not raise a double jeopardy defense in a criminal
trial." 76 So viewed, the "nevertheless" clause seeks to preserve the right
72. As Chief Justice Marshall stated, he "is elected from the mass of the people"
and "returns to the mass of the people." 1 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 181.
73. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 394 (1821). Chief Justice Marshall
added, "This cannot, therefore, be the true construction of the article."
74. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 782
(5th ed. 1905).
75. Bork, supra note 71. at 8.
76. Id. at 10. Mr. Bork properly points out that "impeachment and the criminal
process serve different ends so that the outcome of one has no legal effect upon the
outcome of the other," a conclusion justly rested on James Wilson:
Impeachments . . . come not . . . within the sphere of ordinary jurisprudence.
They are founded on different principles; are governed by different maxims, and
are directed to different objects; for this reason, the trial and punishment of an
offense in the impeachment, is no bar to a trial of the same offense at common
[criminal] law.
Bork, supra note 71, at 8-9, citing I J. WILSON, WORKS 324 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
Bork, at 11, also cites cases in state courts that reached a similar conclusion under
constitutional provisions modeled on Article 1, § 3, such as Commonwealth v. Rowe,
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to a subsequent criminal prosecution, not to prescribe that it must be
preceded by impeachment. Justice Miller's statement in Langford v.
United States that "the ministers personally, like our President,
may be impeached; or if the wrong amounts to a crime, they may
be indicted" 77 likewise rebuts insistence that indictment must fol-
low after impeachment.
This conclusion is further buttressed by other factors. "The only
explicit immunity in the Constitution," said Solicitor General Bork,
"is the limited immunity granted Congressmen" 7 in Article I, § 6,
which provides:
The Senators and Representatives . . .shall in all cases, except
treason, felony or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses,
and in going to and returning from the same.
In the words of Mr. Bork:
Since the Framers knew how to, and did, spell out immunity,
the natural inference is that no immunity exists where none
is mentioned.
70
The Supreme Court has employed that principle of construction. 0
Not only is this the "natural inference," but we have the testimony
of Charles Pinckney, one of the most active participants in the Con-
stitutional Convention, who, in explaining the Constitution to the
South Carolina Ratification Convention, stated that no immunity for
the President was intended. Speaking in the Senate in 1800, Pinckney
said that "it never was intended to give Congress . . .any but spec-
112 Ky. 482, 66 S.V. 29 (1902); State v. Jefferson, 90 N.J.L. 507, 101 A. 569 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1917). In addition, Bork, at 16n., points to United States v. Kerner (involving
an indictment and conviction of Circuit Judge Otto Kerner prior to impeachment)
then pending in the 7th Circuit and since decided in favor of the Department of
Justice position that such a judge is a subject of indictment and conviction prior to
impeachment and removal. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1974, at 6, col. 1. To this may be
added that Justice William Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, advised Attorney General John Mitchell that the United States could
prosecute Justice Abe Fortas without waiting on impeachment. Keeffe, Explorations in
the Wonderland of Impeachment, 59 A.B.A.J. 885, 886 (1973).
77. 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879).
78. Bork, supra note 71, at 4.
79. Id. at 5.
80. See, e.g., T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959): "We find it
impossible to impute to Congress an intention to give such a right to shippers under
the Motor Carriers Act when the very sections which established that right in Part I
[for railroads] were wholly omitted in the Motor Carriers Act."
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ified [privileges], and those very limited privileges indeed."8' And
addressing himself to certain privileges under discussion, he stated,
"No privilege of this kind was intended for your Executive, nor
any except which I have mentioned for your Legislature. The Con-
vention . . . well knew that . . . no subject had been more abused
than privilege. They therefore determined to set the example, in
merely limiting privilege to what was necessary, and no more."
'8 2
James Wilson, considered by Washington "to be one of the strongest
men in the Convention," 3 assured the Pennsylvania Ratification Con-
vention that "not a single privilege is annexed to his [the President's]
character."84 Remarks such as these were a response to the per-
vasive distrust of executive power.8 5 Nothing in the prior English
practice, with which the Framers were familiar, 0 suggests a require-
ment that impeachment had to precede indictment. On several oc-
casions the Parliament preferred to refer the case to the courts; and
one of the most learned lawyers in Parliament, Sir John Maynard,
said of the charges against Sir Adam Blair: "I would not go before
the Lords, when the law is clear, and may be tried by juries."
8' 7
Constitutional history therefore confirms the inference properly drawn
from the face of the Constitution that no immunity was given to
the President.
By a feat of legerdemain Mr. Bork would read the President out
of this history. He recognizes that the impeachment debate "re-
lated almost exclusively to the Presidency" and that "the impeach-
ment clause was expanded to cover the Vice President and other
civil officers only toward the very end of the Convention."' s Mr.
81. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 72 (1800).
82. Id. at 74. In the course of his remarks, Pinckney addressed himself to the
questions "why the Constitution should have been so attentive to each branch of Con-
gress . . . and have shown so little to the President ... in this respect. Why should
the individual members of either branch . . . have more privileges than him [sic]."
Id. Thus the withholding of presidential immunity was no oversight; it was inten-
tional. The explanation lies in history cited by the Supreme Court. See pp. 1129-30 infra.
83. M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSrVUTION 21 (1913).
84. 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 480 (1836). In his Lectures of 1791, James Wilson, a Justice
of the Supreme Court, rephrased this as follows: "[T]he most powerful magistrates
should be amenable to the law .... No one should be secure while he violates the
constitution and the laws." 1 J. WILSON, supra note 76, at 425.
85. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 49-50, 52-53 (1974).
Hamilton was constrained to rebut attacks upon grants to the President by those who,
"[c]alculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy," portrayed the President
"as the full-grown progeny of that detested parent." THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 448
(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton).
86. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 328 (See pages cited under heading "Founders.").
Compare id. at 70, with id. at 89; and see id. at 171 n.217.
87. Id. at 49.
88. Bork, supra note 71, at 6-7.
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Bork's view presents the anomaly that the history of the impeach-
ment provision, framed entirely in the context of the President, re-
fers only to the "Vice President and all civil officers," who were
virtually unmentioned and were added as a last-minute afterthought.
Thus a provision the "sole purpose" of which was to forfend the
double jeopardy argument, which was not designed "to establish the
sequence" of impeachment or indictment, and which is accompanied
by an "immunity" provision limited to Congress (without immunity
for felonies) so that "the natural inference is that no immunity exists
where none is intended," suddenly is found to establish precisely that
"sequence" and to confer exactly that un-"natural" immunity on
the President. When we emerge from Bork's elaborate argument that
the President must be impeached before he is indicted, it adds up
to a claim of immunity from criminal prosecution that was denied
him. On what grounds is this analytical somersault justified?
Mr. Bork first states that the Framers' "remarks strongly suggest
an understanding that the President, as Chief Executive, would not
be subject to the ordinary criminal process . . . For example .. .
Gouverneur Morris observed that the Supreme Court would 'try
the President after the trial of the impeachment.' "89 That this is
ill-considered shorthand emerges from the reference to a trial by
the Supreme Court, which can only hear an appeal. Bork also cites
Hamilton for the assertion that "the Framers' discussion assumed
that impeachment would precede criminal trial."90 Hamilton's par-
ticipation in the Convention was sporadic and had little, if any,
influence.91 At the close of the Convention he handed Madison a
plan in which he proposed that the President be impeached and
removed and "be afterwards tried and punished." 92 So far as the
records show, it was not considered by the Convention. The Framers
were fastidious draftsmen, keenly alive to the weight of every word.93
89. Bork, supra note 71, at 6, citing 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 500 (1911) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].
90. Bork, supra note 71, at 17. Another citation by Bork, at 6, is to 2 FARRAND
64-69, 626. Nothing relevant to the impeachment-indictment sequence is contained in
those pages.
91. J. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: PORTRAIT IN PARADOX 174-76, 178 (1959).
92. 3 FARRAND, supra note 89, at 617, 625.
93. Compare their rejection of "high misdemeanor" because it has a "technical mean-
ing too limited" and the substitution of "high crimes and misdemeanors" for "mal-
administration." R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 74. As was said by Chief Justice Taney:
"[N]o word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added . . . .Every word appears to
have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have
been fully understood." Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571 (1840).
1127
The Yale Law Journal
They employed neither "after" nor "afterwards" ;94 and it is not for
us to supply a word thus omitted, to convert "nevertheless" (in
spite of) into "afterward," that is, to transform a nonsequential pro-
vision into a prescribed sequence. Nor can the mistaken Morris-
Hamilton versions of the provision be read to create the very im-
munity that the Framers intentionally withheld from the President
when they squarely faced the issue. The § 3 proviso must be read
together with the immunity provision; if possible both should be
given effect.9 Above all, we "cannot rightly prefer" a meaning "which
will defeat rather than effectuate the Constitutional purpose."0 6
If, however, the remarks of Morris and Hamilton are to override
this withholding of immunity, they no less demand that the "Vice
President and all civil officers" likewise first be impeached and
then indicted. Mr. Bork's anticipatory answer was that "[i]t is, of
course, significant that such remarks referred only to the President,
not to the Vice President and other civil officers."0' 7 How could it
be otherwise when the President was the sole object of discussion?
There was no allusion to impeachment of the others until the end
when the "Vice President and all civil officers" were casually added
to the impeachment provision without discussion. 98 As Bork him-
self has stated, "[N]one of the general debates addressed or con-
sidered the particular nature of the powers [or immunities] of the
Vice President or other civil officers." 99 How then could the Framers
consider the denial to them of an immunity allegedly granted to
the President? The fact is that all the history cited by Mr. Bork
to establish the prior indictability of the Vice President had ref-
erence to the President alone and establishes his prior indictability.
After his bow to history, Mr. Bork turns to the structure of the
Constitution, wherein he finds "embedded" reasons for drawing the
distinction between the President and the others.'00 No such dis-
tinction was, of course, drawn by the Founders; it is the product
94. Compare Hamilton's suggestion that on impeachment the President be suspended
until judgment, 3 FARRAND, supra note 89, at 617, 625, with the rejection of such a
motion made by Morris and Rutledge. 2 FARRAND 612. When Hamilton stated in THE
FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 85, at 446, that "[t]he President would be liable
[in impeachment] and would afterwards be liable to (criminal] prosecution," he was
referring to his own plan rather than a faithful rendition of Article I § 3.
95. For the appropriate rule of construction, see, e.g., United States v. Menasche,
348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955); cf. Fisher v. District of Columbia, 164 F.2d 707, 708-09
(D.C. Cir. 1948).
96. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941).
97. Bork, supra note 71, at 6.
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of presidential counsel 185 years after the event. In a nutshell, Bork
rings the changes on "the singular importance of the President."' 01
The crucial nature of the President's executive responsibilities, on
which Mr. Bork lays such great store, played no role in the impeach-
ment debate. Instead, opponents of impeachment urged that it would
invade the President's "independence" and violate the separation of
powers, 10 2 a central principle from which the Framers proceeded.
The felt necessity for a curb on presidential transgressions, how-
ever, overcame this "independence" argument; despite the "crucial
nature" of his powers, the Framers gave Congress power to oust him
for various noncriminal offenses. 0 3 They made no move to inter-
fere with the normal criminal process that applied to every person;
on the contrary, they withheld from him an immunity from criminal
prosecution that, but for felonies, they expressly conferred upon
Congress.
"This limited grant of immunity" to Congress, Bork explains,
"demonstrates a recognition that, although the functions of the leg-
islature are not lightly to be interfered with, the public interest
in the expeditious and even-handed administration of the criminal
law outweighs the cost imposed by the incapacity of a single legis-
lator. Such incapacity does not seriously impair the functioning of
Congress."104 A very different conclusion needs to be drawn from
the fact that "a limited grant of immunity" was conferred upon
members of Congress, whereas none whatever was given to the Presi-
dent: The President was not nearly as "important" in the eyes of
the Framers as he is in those of Bork. "There is little doubt," said
the Supreme Court, "that the instigation of criminal charges against
the critical or disfavored legislators by the executive in a judicial
forum ['the judges were often lackeys of the Stuart monarchs"0 5] was
the chief fear prompting the long struggle for parliamentary privi-
101. Id. at 18.
102. Rufus King referred "to the primitive axiom that the three great departments
of Govts. should be separate & independent," and asked, "Would this be the case if
the Executive should be impeachable?" 2 FARRAND, supra note 89, at 66. Charles
Pinckney stated that impeachment by the Legislature would give it "a rod over the
Executive and by that means effectually destroy his independence." Id.
103. George Mason, expressing the view that prevailed, stated, "No point is of
more importance than that the right of impeachment should be continued." Id. at 65.
Edmund Randolph stated, "The Executive will have great opportunity for abusing his
power." Id. at 67. See also the remarks of James Madison and Elbridge Gerry. Id. at
66. The vote was 8 to 2 in favor of retaining the impeachment power. Id. at 69.
For a discussion of noncriminal offenses, see R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 53-93.
104. Bork, supra note 71, at 16.
105. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966).
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lege in England."'106 Both the "speech and debate" clause and the
"immunity from arrest" clause were "consciously" drawn by the
Framers "from this common historical background,"' 0 7 which be-
speaks fear of rather than special solicitude for executive power.
Moreover, the Founders had observed that the most powerful min-
isters could be condemned to death without endangering the con-
tinuity of government, indeed, in the case of the Earl of Strafford,
conducing to the preservation of liberty."' It is no answer to point
to the invulnerability of the King because first, as Gouverneur Morris
pointed out, "[the first Magistrate] is not the King but the prime-
Minister,"' 0 9 and second, as James Iredell emphasized, the President,
unlike the King, was made triable." 0
A kindred speculation is that "[t]he Framers could not have con-
templated prosecution of an incumbent President because they vested
in him complete power over execution of the laws, which includes,
of course, the power to control prosecutions.""' When President
Nixon acted on this premise and discharged Special Prosecutor Arch-
ibald Cox, who was engaged, among other things, in investigating
whether the President was implicated in the Watergate coverup and
other criminal acts, a storm of outrage swept over the White House." 2
It is reasonable to infer that the Framers never intended to permit
the President to shield himself from criminal indictment by the con-
trol given him over such prosecutions. Next Mr. Bork argues that the
presidential pardoning power extends to a pardon for himself, thus
rendering criminal conviction ineffectual."13 Such a pardon after
conviction would be an even greater affront to the nation than
Nixon's discharge of Cox to impede his own prosecution. The "par-
don" provision must be read in harmony with the "immunity" pro-
vision; it was not designed to confer an immunity intentionally
withheld." 4 Constitutional construction should not depart from com-
106. Id. at 182. See also id. at 178.
107. K. BRAUSHAW & D. PRING, PARLIAMENT AND CONGRESS 95 (1972).
108. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 30-33, 39.
109. 2 FARRAND, supra note 89, at 69.
110. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 84, at 109.
111. Bork, supra note 71, at 20.
112. The discharge was held illegal by District Judge Gerhard Gesell. Nader v. Bork,
366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
113. Bork, supra note 71, at 20.
114. In Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925), the Court said that the pardoning
power "is a check entrusted to the executive for special cases. To exercise it to the
extent of destroying the deterrent effect of judicial punishment would be to pervert
it; but whoever is to make it useful must have full discretion to exercise it. Our
Constitution confers this discretion on the highest officer in the nation in confidence
that he will not abuse it." An abuse "would suggest a resort to impeachment .... "
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mon sense; 115 it should not proceed from horribles that the nation
would reject and that would have even more greatly affronted the
Founders.
Like Solicitor General Bork, Professor Alexander Bickel declares
that the Article I, § 3 provision "does not remotely say that im-
peachment must precede indictment" and like him he considers
that the "case of the President . . . is unique." He does not base
this on the "original intention" but on the premise that "[i]n the
presidency is embodied the continuity and indestructibility of the
state."11 6 He would thereby import into our system the monarchical
notion that the continuity of the state was embodied in the crown:
"L'Etat c'est Moi. 1" 7 But by the eighteenth century, Parliament
had prevailed in its struggle with the King; and the downfalls of
Charles I and James II had shown that the indestructibility of a
King was not synonymous with the "indestructibility of the state."
For Blackstone the "sovereign power" meant "the making of the
laws"; it had come to rest in Parliament, "this being the place where
that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside
somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms.""18
Therefore, if we are to look to the history the Founders had before
them, the Parliament rather than the King was the repository of sov-
ereignty, the symbol of "continuity." Among the revolutionary
changes made by the Founders was to establish that sovereignty re-
sided in the people and that the officers of government were merely
their servants and agents."19 In the words of Gouverneur Morris,
"[T]he people are the King."'120 Presidents come and go but the
people remain. The consensus of the Founders was that the Presi-
dent's main function was to execute the laws, that as commander in
chief he was merely the "first General.' 2' Such functionaries are
115. A respected scholar and judge, Herbert F. Goodrich, stated that "[ilf a legal
rule fails to satisfy the untechnical requirements of ordinary common sense the premises
behind the rule had better be carefully examined." Gavin v. Hudson & Manhattan
Co., 185 F.2d 104, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1950).
116. Bickel, The Constitutional Tangle, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1973, at 14, 15.
117. Gibbon says of Rome that "the obsequious civilians unanimously pronounced
that the republic is contained in the person of its chief." 4 E. GIBBON, THE HISTORY
OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 509 (Nottingham Soc'y ed. undated).
A current illustration is furnished by the statement of Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia on March 11, 1974, albeit with recognition of the winds of change: "[W]hile
the monarchy was a durable institution needed to hold Ethiopia together, its once
overwhelming political power was not 'eternal' and could be varied according to the
requirements and exigencies of the times." N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1974, at 13, col. 1.
118. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 49, 160-61 (1765).
119. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 174-75 (1969). See also G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 362, 377, 382, 530 (1969).
120. 2 FARRAND, supra note 89, at 69.
121. R. BERGER, supra note 85, at 51-52, 61-63.
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expendable rather than indispensable; thus the view of the President
taken by the Framers is incompatible with the proposition that in
him the Framers "embodied the continuity and indestructibility of
the state." The fact that they made him removable from office alone
suggests that a hiatus in his office was not thought to threaten
that "indestructibility." This also emerges from Hamilton's statement
about the King: There is "no punishment to which he can be sub-
jected without involving the crisis of a national revolution,"'122 im-
plying thereby that removal or indictment of the President coald
have no calamitous effect.
The nation has also survived a number of presidential deaths and
assassinations without impairment of the presidency or the "inde-
structibility of the state." It is a mistake, I suggest, to identify the
"continuity;' of the presidency with that of a given President. What-
ever befalls a President, the state and the presidency are "inde-
structible."' 23 The fact is that a Vice President is immediately avail-
able to assume executive functions without skipping a beat; and if
he is unavailable there is a row of statutory successors. William
Henry Harrison died and was succeeded by John Tyler, James A.
Garfield by Chester A. Arthur, Warren G. Harding by Calvin
Coolidge, and Franklin D. Roosevelt by Harry Truman. Upon as-
sassination, Lincoln was succeeded by Andrew Johnson, William Mc-
Kinley by Theodore Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy by Lyndon
B. Johnson. One may hazard that Tyler was an improvement on
Harrison; certainly Theodore Roosevelt was an improvement on
McKinley, as was Coolidge on Harding; Truman was at least an
adequate substitute for an ailing and sinking Franklin Roosevelt.
That is not a bad list to pit against the unfortunate succession of
Andrew Johnson to the chair of Abraham Lincoln. A senseless as-
sassination creates a shock for which the nation is utterly unpre-
pared, in contrast to a removal on impeachment or conviction on
indictment of a President in whom the nation has lost confidence.
Obviously, Professor Bickel states, "the presidency cannot be con-
ducted from jail, nor can it be effectively carried on while an in-
cumbent is defending himself in a criminal trial."' 24 The second
122. THE FEDERALIsT No. 69, supra note 85. at 446.
123. In the words of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: "The Presidency, though its wings
could be clipped for a time, was an exceedingly tough institution. . . . It had endured
many challenges and survived many vicissitudes. It was nonsense to suppose that its
fate as an institution was bound up with the fate of the particular man who happened
to be President at any given time." A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 405
(1973).
124. See Bickel, supra note 116, at 15.
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proposition is by no means obvious; Andrew Johnson did not per-
sonally participate in his impeachment and he continued to perform
the duties of his office. 125 A President equally may entrust his de-
fense in a criminal trial to his counsel. If he feels constrained to
be present, that is no more disturbing to the performance of his
duties than his parallel presence at an impeachment trial; in either
case the effect on his functioning is the same. While it is true that
the presidency "cannot be conducted from jail," it is unrealistic to
postulate that a convicted President could not be released on bail
pending appeal. Moreover, the attempt of a convicted President to
hang on to his office would present a spectacle that the nation would
find intolerable. A storm of public outrage such as would make the
"firestorm" after the Cox discharge seem like a sputtering candle
could sweep him from office. If the President lacked the sensitivity
to resign, 20 an impeachment could speedily follow; the most parti-
san congressman would hardly summon the hardihood to reject the
verdict of the people. The test of the availability of criminal process,
I suggest, should not turn on hypotheticals that strain credulity. "[O]f
what value," said Macaulay, "is a theory which is true only on a
supposition in the highest degree extravagant?"' 127
There is a last practical consideration, which Solicitor General
Bork summarized in the context of "civil officers":
[I]f Article I, Section 3, clause 7, were read to mean that no
one not convicted upon impeachment could be tried criminally,
the failure of the House to vote an impeachment, or the failure
of the impeachment in the Senate, would confer upon the civil
officer accused complete and-were the statute of limitations per-
mitted to run-permanent immunity from criminal prosecution
however plain his guilt.
28
That would be no less true of the President. No great stretch of
the imagination is required to conceive that partisanship in Congress
may defeat an impeachment of the President in the House or con-
viction by two-thirds of the Senate. Suppose that Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski were convinced that he had evidence that would es-
tablish the President's guilt. Although a partisan one-third of the
125. The Framers rejected suspension prior to conviction. See note 94 supra.
126. Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned after indictment and before trial, ex-
plaining in part that the welfare of the nation would thereby be served. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 11, 1973, at 35. col. 3.
127. 2 T. MACAULAY, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS 128 (1890).
128. Bork, supra note 71, at 9-10.
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Senate might differ, can it be reasonable that he should be barred
from prosecution because an impeachment fell prey to partisanship?
A mistake against which we must be ever vigilant is to read our
own predilections back into the minds of the Framers. 120 One of
the most eminent of the Founders, James Iredell, later a Justice of
the Supreme Court, cautioned:
We are too apt, in estimating a law passed at a remote period,
to combine, in our consideration, all the subsequent events
which have had an influence upon it, instead of confining our-
selves (which we ought to do) to the existing circumstances at
the time of its passing.130
These are not merely the yearnings of a legalistic "strict construc-
tionist"; they are a canon of historiography. The task of the his-
torian, Ranke taught, is to establish the facts of history wie es eigent-
lich gewesen war; the search must be for what actually happened
and, if we find it, not to substitute for it what should have happened.
As in the task of construing any document, the primary function
is to ascertain the intention of the draftsmen. When that intention
is discovered, what Iredell said becomes of prime importance: "The
people have chosen to be governed under such and such principles.
They have not chosen to be governed, or promised to submit upon
any other."''3
It is easier, however, to preach such vigilance than to practice
it, as I can testify from personal experience in the very context of
the distinction here under discussion. Influenced by the difficulty of
giving the words "high crimes and misdemeanors" a narrow con-
struction in the case of the President and a broad one for judges,
I initially concluded that they must be given a single meaning. But
I was led to alter my view upon consideration of the fact that judges
were added to the impeachment provision at the last minute with
no reference either to judges or to governing standards. From this
and other data I reasoned that stricter standards of conduct might
be required of a judge, that is, that the range of impeachable of-
fenses might be broader. -32 Whatever the validity of that reasoning,
129. Compare Justice Sutherland on "sovereignty" in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), discussed in Berger, The Presidential
Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MxcH. L. REv. 1, 26-33 (1972).
130. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 267 (1796). See R. BERGER, supra note
119, at 22-23.
131. 2 G. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (1857-1858).
132. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 91-93.
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it cannot be invoked for the president, who was the subject of the
debates and the constitutional restrictions; a broader application of
those restrictions to judges does not warrant a total immunity from
criminal prosecution for the President. Sensible, however, of the "dif-
ficulties involved in adoption of the view that impeachment of judges
requires a less restricted reading of those words [high crimes and
misdemeanors] than does that of the President," I suggested that
"[p]erhaps a better solution is to take a more hospitable approach
to removal of judges by judges for infractions of good behav-
ior . . . '13 indicating thereby that I entertained some doubts about
my change of position.
The problem of giving two meanings to the same words in the
very same context has continued to trouble me, the more so as I
examined the difficulties which Mr. Bork's analysis engendered, his
attempt to render utterances exclusively directed at the President
applicable solely to "the Vice President and all civil officers," who
were not mentioned. My thinking has reverted to my initial view,
additionally influenced by the statement of the Supreme Court in
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States: "[T]here is a natural
presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same
act are intended to have the same meaning .... .,134 Here the pre-
sumption is fortified by the fact that the words are used not in
different parts of the Constitution but in one place, in the very
same context; and Mr. Bork seeks to give them a different meaning
with respect to whom they apply. No trace of an intention to give
them that dual meaning is to be found in the history of the pro-
vision. This is not to say that the presumption is irrebuttable,135
but that the rebuttal cannot rest on factors that were not before
the Framers, on an image of the presidency which is a product of
our times and which they emphatically did not share.
Such distinctions represent but another attempt to revise the Con-
stitution under the guise of euphemisms, derived from an exalted
notion of the presidency which is far removed from the egalitarian
133. Id. at 93.
134. 286 US. 427, 433 (1932).
135. The Court stated,
Where the subject matter [impeachment] to which the words refer is not the
same in the several places where they are used, or the conditions are different,
or the scope of the legislative power exercised in one case is broader than that
exercised in another, the meaning may well vary to meet the purposes of the law,
to be arrived at by a consideration of the language in which those purposes are
expressed, and of the circumstances under which the language was employed.
Id.
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sentiments of the Founders.13 6 When the subpoena to Jefferson is-
sued, Albert Beveridge, who had scoured the newspapers of the time,
comments "For the first time, most Republicans approved of the
opinion of John Marshall. In the fanatical politics of the time there
was enough honest adherence to the American ideal, that all men
are equal in the eyes of the law, to justify the calling of a President,
even Thomas Jefferson, before a court of justice."'137 It is we who
have surrounded the President with a mystique that has contributed
heavily to an "imperial presidency."'138 When we forget that the
President is "but a man . . . but a citizen"'' t3 we are on the road
that has unfailingly led to Caesarism. It was because the Founders
had learned this lesson from history that presidential powers were
enumerated and limited, and that immunity from arrest was alto-
gether withheld.
156. See note 1 supra. Herbert Butterfield, who has considered the problems of
historiography in his penetrating study, George III and the Historians (rev. ed. 1969),
remarked that "it is often necessary to know a great deal of history before one is
equipped for the interpreting of historical documents." Id. at 18. This is more es-
sential with respect to a constitution. See p. 1134 supra.
137. 3 A. BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 450 (1919).
138. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 123, at x.
139. 1 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 90.
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III. Impeachment: Mr. St. Clair's "Instant History"
If the House "be found incompetent to one of the greatest
[causes] . . . it is impossible that this form of trial should not,
in the end, vanish out of the constitution. For we must not de-
ceive ourselves: whatever does not stand with credit cannot
stand long. And if the constitution should be deprived . . . of
this resource, it is virtually deprived of everything else, that is
valuable in it. For this process is the cement which binds the
whole together . . . here it is that we provide for that, which is
the substantial excellence of our constitution . . . by which . . .
no man in no circumstance, can escape the account, which he
owes to the laws of his country."'
140
When a client proclaims that he will "fight like hell" to balk im-
peachment it may be expected that his lawyer will follow suit. Not
surprisingly, therefore, James St. Clair, chief defense counsel for Presi-
dent Nixon, has favored the House Judiciary Committee with a
lengthy memorandum that purports to prove by recourse to history
that the President may only be impeached for an indictable crime. 14 1
That standard would virtually nullify impeachment for the nonin-
dictable offenses which were the chief concern of the Founders and
which the evidence plainly shows they considered impeachable. Despite
its issuance from the august precincts of the White House, the mem-
orandum is but "lawyer's history," a pastiche of selected snippets
and half-truths, exhibiting a resolute disregard of adverse facts, and
simply designed to serve the best interests of a client rather than
faithfully to represent history as it actually was.
Although defense lawyers are notoriously not the best source of
constitutional history, 142 such pseudo-history cannot be ignored be-
cause, as J. R. Wiggins said of a similar submission by the then
Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers on the issue of execu-
tive privilege, "Unless historians bestir themselves . . . the lawyers'
140. 7 E. BURKE, WORKS 14 (1839) (Burke's opening statement at the trial of Warren
Hastings).
141. J. St. Clair, An Analysis of the Constitutional Standard for Presidential Im-
peachment, issued in late February, 1974 [hereinafter cited as St. Clair]. The memo-
randum consists of six pages of summary and a body of 61 pages.
142. The value of such "history" i's illuminated by the citation, St. Clair at 42-43,
of the argument of Luther Martin on behalf of Justice Samuel Chase in 1805. Martin,
a heavy drinker, appeared in 1810 before Justice Chase on circuit in Baltimore, some-
what more inebriated than usual. Chase complained, "I am surprised that you can
so prostitute your talents." Martin replied, "Sir, I never prostituted my talents except
when I defended you and Col. Burr;" and turning to the jury he added confidentially,
"[A] couple of the greatest rascals in the world." P. CLARKsoN & R. JETr, LUTHER
MARTIN OF MARYLAND 280 (1970). In vino veritas.
1137
The Yale Law Journal
summary that has placed 170 years of history squarely behind the
assertion of unlimited executive power to withhold information
threatens to get incorporated into that collection of fixed beliefs
and settled opinions that governs the conduct of affairs. History
thereafter may become what lawyers mistakenly said it was there-
fore."'143 "Legal history," said Justice Frankfurter, "still has its
claims."'
44
In the present controversial atmosphere it is all too easy to say
"a plague on both your houses" and evenhandedly to attribute par-
tisan readings of history to one and all. My study, however, of the
meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors," the central issue of
impeachment, was undertaken in 1968-1970, submitted to the South-
ern California Law Review in mid-summer of 1970, and published
in 1971,145 long before Watergate surfaced and before there was any
thought that President Nixon might be impeachable. Composed in
the quiet of a university, uninfluenced by fees or hopes of preferment,
my study may or may not be mistaken, but it can hardly be dis-
missed as biased, simply because there then was no occasion whatso-
ever for partisan bias.
A. Indictable Offenses
Let us begin in midstream with the Nixon-St. Clair thesis that
impeachment is available only for an indictable crime. Former At-
torney General Elliot L. Richardson recently stated, "It seems clear
to me as a matter of common sense that impeachable offenses can-
not be limited to matters defined in the U.S. Penal Code."'146 Com-
mon sense is buttressed by the historical record. Mr. St. Clair, quoting
the Supreme Court, recognizes that under federal law there are no
crimes except as declared by statute: "The legislative authority of the
Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it .... ,,147
That is what the Act of 1790 did for treason and bribery;'148 but
143. Wiggins, Lawyers as Judges of History, 75 PROCEEDINGS MASS. Hisr. Soc'y 84,
104 (1963).
144. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 609 (1942) (concurring opinion).
145. Berger, Impeachment for 'High Crimes and Misdemeanors,' 44 S. CAL. L. REv.
395 (1971).
146. Harv. L. Record, Mar. 15, 1974, at 9.
147. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 17, quoting United States v. Hudson &- Goodwin,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
148. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1, 21, 1 Stat. 112, 117.
Professor Jefferson Fordham states that "treason is defined as a crime by the Con-
stitution in the judicial article with the element of sanction left to the Congress."
Fordham, Book Review, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 673, 676 (1974). The Supreme Court held
that, to constitute a crime, it is necessary to "affix a punishment to proscribed con-
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with the exception of a handful of statutes, such as those that make
"high misdemeanors" of privateering against friendly nations,14 9
launching military expeditions against them from American soil,150
practicing law by a federal judge, .1 1 conspiring or counseling to in-
surrection or riot,'1 " there are no indictable "high misdemeanors."
Consequently, the offenses the Founders particularly had in mind
would be unimpeachable. Consider "subversion of the Constitution"
-usurpation of power, the very offense that prompted the addition
of the words "high crimes and misdemeanors." George Mason said
in the Federal Convention:
Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many great
and dangerous offenses. Hastings is not guilty of Treason. At-
tempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Treason as above
defined. . . . It is the more necessary to extend the power of
impeachments.'
Under Mr. St. Clair's interpretation the manifest intention of the
Framers to reach such subversion would be frustrated by the lack
of an indictable crime, for no federal statute has made it a crime.
So too, other categories of "high crimes and misdemeanors," under
the English practice upon which our impeachment provisions were
modeled and which were mentioned by the Founders, such as "abuse
of power," "betrayal of trust," and "neglect of duty," would also
fall by the wayside. Yet Madison stated that protection against
presidential "negligence" was indispensable, that perversion of the
office "into a scheme of . . . oppressi'on," that is, "abuse of power,"
duct." United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). Had Congress
elected not to "affix a punishment," treason would not have constituted a "crime";
no one could have been prosecuted for treason. By the Act of 1790, treason was
made a crime; it will hardly be maintained that prior thereto treasonable acts were
indictable. An unpunishable "crime" is like "a grin without a cat."
Since, as Fordham recognized, "the definition appears to be intended for all pur-
poses, including impeachment," 47 S. CAL. L. REV. at 676, it cannot be assumed that
impeachment for treason was criminal in nature. The fact that George Mason em-
phasized that "treason" as defined would not reach "subversion of the Constitution"
and suggested "maladministration" which, to say the least, comprehended some acts
of noncriminal nature, alone argues against such an assumption. See 2 FARRAND, supra
note 89, at 550, cited in R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 86. The substitution of "high
crimes and misdemeanors" for Mason's "maladministration" indicates that the asso-
ciation of "high crimes and misdemeanors" with "treason" was not thought to render
"high crimes and misdemeanors" criminal for impeachment purposes.
149. Act of June 14, 1797, ch. I, § 1, 1 Stat. 520.
150. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 5, 1 Stat. 384.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 454 (1970).
152. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 1, 1 Stat. 381-82.
153. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 86. Chapter 2 of my book incorporates the
article cited in note 145 supra.
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should be impeachable.'5 Madison, C. C. Pinckney, and Gouverneur
Morris referred to "betrayal of trust";'"5 Edward Rutledge spoke
of "abuse of trust," as did Hamilton in The Federalist.1 6
Madison, the leading architect of the Constitution, furnished three
illustrations of impeachable offenses that have never been made in-
dictable crimes: (1) In the Virginia Ratification Convention he
stated that "if the President be connected, in any suspicious man-
ner with any person, and there be grounds to believe that he will
shelter him," he may be impeached.' 57 (2) In the First Congress-
that "almost adjourned session of the Convention"-he said that the
President would be impeachable if he "neglects to superintend [his
subordinates'] conduct, so as to check their excesses."' 15 (3) There
too he stated that "the wanton removal of meritorious officers" would
be impeachable.'x 9 To this day all of these categories of "high crimes
and misdemeanors" have not been made indictable crimes, reflecting
a continuing judgment by Congress, which has the "sole" jurisdic-
tion of impeachment, that indictable crimes are not a prerequisite to
impeachment, as four convictions by the Senate for nonindictable
offenses confirm. 60
One hundred and forty years ago Justice Story pointed out that
only treason and bribery were made indictable offenses by statute
and that insistence on indictable crimes would enable impeachable
offenders to escape scot-free and render the impeachment provisions
"a complete nullity."'' The absurdity of Mr. St. Clair's analysis is
pointed up by his incongruous juxtaposition of the 1790 treason
and bribery statutes. "Any person" could be indicted under the
"treason" Act whereas the "bribery" Act was specifically directed
against judges who had accepted bribes.' 62 Even today it is open to
question whether the bribery statute embraces the President.0 3 Ju-
154. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 89.
155. Id.
156. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 85, at 423.
157. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 89.
158. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 372-73 (1789) (page running head "History of Congress").
159. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 498 (1789) (page running head "History of Congress").
160. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 57 n.15.
161. Id. at 77. See 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 796, 798 (5th ed. 1905). An earlier work, W. RAWLE, A VIEw OF THE CONSTh-
TUTION 273 (2d ed. 1829), had come to the same conclusion.
162. See note 148 supra.
163. Members of Congress and officers of the United States were added by the
Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 81, § 6, 10 Stat. 171. Today, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970) covers
"public official[s]," defined as "member[s] of Congress . . . or an officer or employee
or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department." Under
the prior Act, an "officer of the United States" was deemed one "appointed by the
President . . . or the head of some executive department." United States v. Van Wert,
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dicial bribery was not mentioned in the Convention, but Gouverneur
Morris emphasized that the President "may be bribed," and he in-
stanced that "Charles II was bribed by Louis XIV"104 and that there-
fore the President ought to be impeachable. Notwithstanding that
the President was the only mentioned object of constitutional im-
peachment for "bribery," he would be unimpeachable on Mr. St.
Clair's reasoning because the penal "bribery" statute was confined
to judges. Nor can we take seriously Mr. St. Clair's argument that
"high crimes and misdemeanors" must involve criminal "offenses of
such a serious nature [as] to be akin to treason and bribery."'10
Treason and bribery are rank unequals. Treason is the arch offense
-betrayal of the state to the enemy-whereas acceptance of so much
as 550 as a bribe for favorable official action suffices to constitute
bribery. Who would maintain that acceptance of such a petty bribe
is more heinous than presidential usurpation or abuse of power?
It remains to add two Founders' statements that repel the equa-
tion of an impeachable offense with an indictable crime. After ad-
verting to impeachment in the North Carolina Ratification Conven-
tion, James Iredell stated that "the person convicted is further
liable to a trial at common law, and may receive such common-law
[criminal] punishment as belongs to a description of such offenses,
if it be punishable by that law."'66 In other words, an offense may
be impeachable although it is not criminally punishable. Similar
recognition is evidenced by George Nicholas' distinction in the Vir-
ginia Ratification Convention between disqualification from office and
"further punishment if [the President] has committed such high
crimes as are punishable at common law."'167 This clearly implies that
some "high crimes" are not thus punishable and nevertheless im-
peachable. Finally, there is Hamilton's statement in The Federalist
No. 65 that an impeachment proceeding "can never be tied down by
such strict rules ...as in common [criminal] cases [which] serve to
limit the discretion of the courts in favor of personal security,"' 68
an analysis which Department of Justice lawyers concede "cuts against
the argument that 'high crimes and misdemeanors' should be limited
195 F. 974, 976 (N.D. Iowa 1912); cf. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510
(1878); and under the maxim noscitur et sociis the words "employee or person" might
similarly exclude the President.
164. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 89.
165. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 34.
166. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 75 n.lll (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 79. See note 184 infra for Hamilton's similar statement.
168. THE FRD.mAasr No. 65, supra note 85, at 425-26.
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to criminal offenses."'169 We can hardly prefer Mr. St. Clair to Hamil-
ton, Madison, et al. as an expounder of the Framers' intention. That
Mr. St. Clair can maintain against this background that we should
"uphold the intent of the drafters of the Constitution that impeach-
able offenses be limited to criminal violations"'170 only illustrates to
what lengths advocacy will go.
B. High Crimes and Misdemeanors
Mr. St. Clair belabors the fact that in England, where removal from
office and criminal punishment were united in one and the same
proceeding, impeachment was criminal in nature,"7 ' a fact no one
would dispute, albeit the crime, as we shall see, was of a peculiar
sort. He totally ignores the impact of a momentous departure from
the prior English practice, embodied in Article I, § 3(7), the separa-
tion between removal and criminal proceedings:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal . . .and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
Office ... but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable...
to Indictment . . . and Punishment, according to Law.'
72
In other words, if criminal law covered the offense, it would be
indictable. Thus removal was to be a prophylactic measure, to re-
move an unfit man from office; criminal punishment was left to a
separate proceeding. As Justice Story stated in 1830, impeachment
"is not so much designed to punish an offender as to secure the
state against gross official misdemeanors .... [I]t simply divests him
of his political capacity,"' 7 3 it removes and disqualifies him from of-
fice. Thus, in place of the combined English removal and criminal
proceedings the Framers divorced the two, with consequences that
James Wilson immediately perceived:
Impeachments . . .come not . ..within the sphere of ordinary
[i.e., criminal] jurisprudence. They are founded on different
principles; are governed by different maxims, and are directed
169. Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice, Legal Aspects of Impeachment: An
Overview, February 1974, at 14 [hereinafter cited as Justice Dep't Memorandum].
170. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 38-39 (emphasis in original).
171. Id. at 7, 10, 12, 13, 20, 26, 38. "To further reinforce the criminal nature of
the process," says St. Clair, id. at 26-27, "an early draft provided that an impeachment
was to be tried before the Supreme Court," as if the Court was to hear no civil cases.
By the same reasoning, the subsequent transfer of the trial to the Senate should mark
the offense as noncriminal.
172. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
173. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 79. See note 184 infra.
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to different objects; for this reason, the trial and punishment of
an offense on impeachment, is no bar to a trial of the same of-
fense at common law.174
When Mr. St. Clair emphasizes the criminal nature of impeachment
in England, he overlooks that there it was part and parcel of a crim-
inal proceeding. The separation of the two in our Constitution de-
mands a construction of impeachment in noncriminal terms lest it
fall afoul of other constitutional provisions.
First there is double jeopardy. Were impeachment criminal in
nature, as Mr. St. Clair repeatedly stresses, a conviction or acquittal
on impeachment would bar a criminal indictment and a prior con-
viction or acquittal on indictment would bar an impeachment, for
no man can be tried twice for the same offense1'T Both Wilson and
Story were aware of the play of double jeopardy in the constitutional
provision. 17 The Framers meant to have both impeachment and in-
dictment available, not to put Congress to a choice between either
one or the other. Mr. St. Clair says not a word of the impact on
double jeopardy of the separation of removal from indictment, a
matter set forth for Mr. St. Clair in my book, Impeachment: The
Constitutional Problems, which he quotes when it fits his needs."
7
Another example of selective history in this same focus is his ci-
tation of the Article III, § 3(3) provision that "trial of all crimes
except .. . impeachment shall be by jury" in order to demonstrate
that impeachment was limited to "criminal matters."'' 78 He ignores
the fact, which I had also pointed out, that, with this exception
before them, the draftsmen of the Sixth Amendment omitted it and
extended trial by jury to "all criminal proceedings." Presumably
they felt no need to exempt impeachment from the Sixth Amend-
ment because they did not consider it a criminal prosecution. If im-
peachment be indeed criminal in nature, as Mr. St. Clair maintains,
it must be tried by jury, not by the Senate, because "all criminal
proceedings" means all, particularly after the omission of the prior
exception, and second, because the Bill of Rights modifies all prior
provisions of the Constitution that are in conflict with it.1' 9
Constitutional analysis need not depart from common sense;' 80 the
174. Id. at 80.
175. Id. at 80.81.
176. Id.; I J. STORY, supra note 161, § 782; see J. WILSON, supra note 76.
177. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 3.
178. Id. at 37-38.
179. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 81-82.
180. See note 115 supra.
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fact that the criteria of what were impeachable crimes in England
were employed by the Framers to identify causes for removal from
office does not serve to make removal criminal, as a familiar example
will make clear. Suppose that Jones runs a red light at 80 miles an
hour and crashes into Smith, severely injuring Smith and destroying
his car. Such reckless driving constitutes a criminal offense, but that
does not convert a civil suit to recover damages on those facts into
a criminal proceeding. The difference was appreciated by Solicitor
General Bork, who pointed out that "just as an individual may
be both criminally prosecuted and deported for the same offense
* . .a civil officer could be both impeached and criminally pun-
ished .... ,81' Deportation, the Supreme Court held, "is not punish-
ment for a crime. . . . It is but a method of enforcing the return
to his country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions"
laid down for his residence, 182 exactly as impeachment is designed
solely to remove an unfit officer for the good of the state. That
criminal prosecution may also be had on the same grounds does
not render either deportation or removal by impeachment criminal.
Solicitor General Bork justly concluded that "conviction of impeach.
ment under our Constitution has no criminal consequences," whereas
"impeachment in England was designed to accomplish punishment
as well as removal."'183 Without criminal penalties such as fine
or imprisonment, and limited to removal of an unfit officer, im-
peachment cannot be criminal in nature.18
4
But, Mr. St. Clair argues, such terms as "convicted" and the like
"are all terms limited in context to criminal matters."'183 This ter-
minology was taken into account by me in 1970, and I suggested that
the Framers, engaged in an immense task-the drafting of a written
Constitution for a new nation in the short space of fourteen weeks
-could not at each step undertake "to coin a fresh and different
vocabulary." That would have involved an insuperable labor.',,
As the Department of Justice lawyers recognize, quoting Professor
John Pomeroy's mid-19th century treatise, "The word is borrowed,
the procedure is imitated, and no more; the object and end of the
181. Bork, supra note 71, at 10n.**.
182. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 81.
183. Bork, supra note 71, at 10n.**.
184. Hamilton distinguished between "their removal from office" and "their actual
punishment in cases which would admit of it." THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 85,
at 461 (emphasis added). He thus recognized, as did Iredell and Nicholas, that some
impeachable offenses could not be punished criminally. See p. 1141 supra.
185. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 38.
186. R. BERGEi, supra note 68, at 85.
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process are far different. 'u s To give this borrowed terminology con-
clusive effect on the issue of criminality is to invite the application
of double jeopardy and trial by jury rather than by the Senate, as
well as to disregard all of the statements by the Founders that clearly
demonstrate their intention to make nonindictable offenses im-
peachable, an intention that courts normally strive to effectuate. Were
these conflicting pulls between terminology and "original intention"
and the like to be posed to a court, it would attempt to balance them
not, like Mr. St. Clair's selective history, to avoid the inescapable
task of weighing heavily countervailing factors.
More than a little confusion has resulted from the fact that the
Constitution employs the words "high crimes and misdemeanors."
The starting point is that "high crimes and misdemeanors" and or-
dinary "crimes and misdemeanors" are altogether different in mean-
ing and origin. "High crimes and misdemeanors," which the his-
torical evidence shows meant "high crimes and high misdemeanors,"
referred to offenses against the state, as the companion words "trea-
son, bribery" indicate. Such offenses were triable by Parliament un-
der the Lex Parliamentaria or law of Parliament. When the words
were first employed in 1386 there was no such ordinary crime as
"misdemeanor"; lesser crimes were then punishable as "trespasses."
"Misdemeanors" supplanted "trespasses" early in the 16th century,
and, as Fitzjames Stephen pointed out, they were proceedings for
wrongs against the individual and were triable in the courts rather
than in Parliament. 8 8 It is safe to say that "high crimes and mis-
demeanors" were words of art peculiar to parliamentary impeach-
ment 8 9 and had no relation to ordinary "crimes and misdemeanors"
that were triable by the courts. "High misdeme'anors," it may be add-
ed, never entered the criminal law administered by the English couirts,
nor were ordinary "misdemeanors" a criterion for impeachments. 190
In the main, Mr. St. Clair accepts this analysis: He states that
"high crimes and misdemeanors" "was the standard phrase" used in
"parliamentary impeachments," "a unitary phrase meaning crimes
187. Justice Dep't Memorandum, supra note 169, Appendix I at 24. Compare pp. 1143-
44 supra.
188. J. STEVENS, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 60 (1863) cited in R. BERGER, supra
note 68, at 61.
189. Justice Frankfurter stated, "Words of art bring their art with them. They bear
the meaning of their habitat . . . whether it be loaded with recondite connotations
of feudalism." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 537 (1947). For the meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors," see
pp. 1139-40 supra.
190. R. BERGEa, supra note 68, at 61-63.
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against the state, as opposed to those against individuals."'91 He
agrees that the word "high" modifies both "crimes and misde-
meanors," and "refers to official conduct, conduct relating to one's
function with respect to the State."'19 2 But he repeatedly skitters
from "high misdemeanor" to "misdemeanor"; he cites, for example,
Blackstone's distinction between "crimes" and "smaller faults and
omissions . . . termed misdemeanors," notwithstanding that Black-
stone, as Mr. St. Clair notices, differentiated "high misdemeanors"
as "high offenses against the King and government.'' 19 3 The Framers
well understood that "high misdemeanors" had a "technical mean-
ing too limited"; 94 and intellectual honesty demands an end to such
verbal play on "misdemeanor," an end to shifts from historical mean-
ing to "its present day context," whereunder "the purpose of in-
clusion of the word 'misdemeanor' is to include lesser criminal of-
fenses that are not felonies."'195 For the Framers undeniably bor-
191. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 19 (emphasis in original).
192. Id. at 25, 33. His explanation of "high" is rested on "modern usage," citing
to the HOUSE JUDICIARY CoM., 93d CoNG, Ist Sass., IMPEACHMENT: SLECTED MATERIALS
622 (Comm. Print 1973). The citation to page 622 is to a reprint of my 1971 article,
at which point I was tracing the centuries-long development, culminating in Blackstonel
193. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 21-22, 23. He neglected to notice Blackstone's state-
ment in his discussion of "Misprisions . . . generally denominated contempts or high
misdemeanors; of which 1. The first and principal is the mal-administration of such
high officers, as are in public trust and employment. This is usually punished by
the method of parliamentary impeachment ... ." 4 V. BLACKSTONE, supra note 118,
at 121 (emphasis in original). Contempts were punished by the respective tribunals
against whom contemptuous conduct was proven, the courts or the Parliament. I recall
no case in which Parliament turned to a court for punishment of a contempt
against itself.
194. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 86.
195. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 34 (emphasis in original). It is beside the point
to say that "in common parlance a misdemeanor is considered a crime by lawyers,
judges, defendants, and the general public," id. at 33, first, because a "high misde-
meanor" is quite different from a "misdemeanor," and second, because the test of
such a "technical" common law term is not present "common parlance" but what it
meant to the Framers.
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference
to the common law and British institutions as they were when the instrument was
framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted
it to the ratification of the Conventions of the Thirteen States, were born and
brought up in the atmosphere of the common law and thought and spoke in its
vocabulary . . . . [T]hey expressed [their conclusions] in terms of the common
law, confident that they could be shortly and easily understood.
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108 (1925); cf. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681,
688 (1964).
To import "high" by resort to history as a special species of crime and then to
argue that the words "'high crimes and misdemeanors' . . . are so clear and un-
equivocal in and of themselves" that it is not "necessary to look beyond the words,"
St. Clair, supra note 141, at 32, 38, indicates that the right hand knew not what the
left was doing. This maneuver was designed to invoke the "plain meaning" rule, which
once shut off extrinsic evidence, but which has been badly battered in the last fifty
years. Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968); United States v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940); Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J.).
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rowed "high misdemeanor" from the law of Parliament; they did
not borrow "misdemeanor" from the "criminal" law of the courts. To
glide from their meaning to the "modern context" and to a view that
"misdemeanor" "include[s] lesser criminal offenses" is to revise the
Constitution, the very thing Mr. St. Clair should most fear, lest it
lead to the unbridled discretion not long since attributed to Con-
gress by Vice President Gerald Ford and former Attorney General
Kleindienst. 190
C. Mr. St. Clair's Theories
Mr. St. Clair does not attempt to deal with the constitutional
separation between impeachment and indictment, the consequent
problems of double jeopardy, trial by jury of "all criminal prose-
cutions," or the long-standing dichotomy between parliamentary trials
of political "high misdemeanors" and court trials of criminal "mis-
demeanors," but he comes up with some far-fetched theories. He be-
gins with the American "commitment to two central and interrelated
ideas. The first is the theory of limited government and the second
is the mechanism of separation of powers."'
197
Both President Nixon and Mr. St. Clair disregard the fact that
the Framers adopted impeachment as a breach in the separation of
powers. In the Federal Convention Rufus King dwelt on the "primi-
tive axiom that the three great departments of Govts. should be
separate & independent .... Would this be the case if the Executive
should be impeachable? . . [It] would be destructive of his in-
dependence and of the principles of the Constitution."' 98 Charles
Pinckney likewise urged that it would "effectually destroy his in-
dependence."' 199 But such views were decisively rejected by a vote
of 8 to 2, because, as George Mason stressed, "[N]o point is of more
importance than that the right of impeachment should be continued."
Madison "thought it indispensable that some provision should be
made for defending the Community against the incapacity, negligence
196. See R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 53; Wash. Star-News, Apr. 11, 1973, at A2, col. 1.
197. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 2.
198. Id. 2 FARRAND, supra note 89, at 66-67.
199. Particularly disconcerting is St. Clair's non sequitur that that President "was,
while President, unindictable by ordinary criminal process. This, of course, is why
some members of the Constitutional Convention, Mr. Pinckney, for example, thought
impeachment was wholly unnecessary." St. Clair, supra note 141, at 10. Pinckney ex-
plained to the Senate in 1800 that congressmen were given specific and very limited
privileges (immunity from arrest) and none were given to the President. 10 ANNALS OF
CON,. 72, 74 (1800). This ill comports with an attribution to him of presidential
unindictability.
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or perfidy of the chief Magistrate." Impeachment was favored by
Edmund Randolph because the "Executive will have great oppor-
tunity of abusing his power." 200 It was precisely to effectuate the
limits on executive power embodied in the Constitution that im-
peachment was adopted. As Elias Boudinot, for years President of
the Continental Congress, said in the First Congress, impeachment is
an "exception to a principle," the separation of powers.20 1 Com-
menting on Hamilton's statement that impeachments were regarded
''as a bridle in the hands of the legislative body upon the executive
servants ..... 02 Department of Justice lawyers state that Hamilton
was "justifying the exceptions to the separation of powers found in
the American provisions relating to impeachment." 2 3 The extra-
ordinary spectacle now presented by presidential attempts to define
the jurisdiction of the House Judiciary Committee and to limit its
access to White House documents based on an invocation of the
separation of powers stands history on its head. This invasion of
the House's "sole" power to impeach, expressed in the Constitution,
is more grotesque when it is compared to Mr. Nixon's strenuous
claims of inviolable "confidentiality" of which the Constitution con-
tains not a trace.
Mr. St. Clair muddies the waters when he cites James Iredell's
1786 statement that the North Carolina Constitution was not de-
signed to fashion a legislative "despotism" but to "guard against
the abuse of unlimited power."20 4 First, in 1788 the Framers ac-
complished that purpose by a careful grant to Congress of enumerated
and limited powers. And second, that Iredell himself believed that
impeachment for nonindictable offenses was not identifiable with
legislative "despotism" is evident in his reference to "impeachment
for concealing important intelligence from the Senate" respecting
foreign relations.205 Mr. St. Clair himself quotes Madison's statement
that "the executive magistracy is carefully limited," whereas the "leg-
islative department derives a superiority .... its constitutional powers
being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits."200
"In republican government," said Madison, "the legislative authority
necessarily predominates." 207 What we are witnessing is a presidential
200. 2 FARRAND, supra note 89, at 69. 65, 67; R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 89.
201. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 118 n.73.
202. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 85, at 425.
203. Justice Dep't Memorandum, supra note 169, Appendix 1 at 23.
204. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 4.
205. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 79.
206. St. Clair 5
207. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 100.
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effort to abort the accountability to Congress that the Founders de-
signed in the impeachment process. This process does not endow
Congress with unlimited power, for it must act within the confines
of "high crimes and misdemeanors. ' 208 It is Mr. St. Clair who would
confer illimitable power on the President by making him unaccount-
able in an impeachment proceeding except on terms that the Presi-
dent lays down. As well may a banker under suspicion dictate the
terms of investigation to a bank examiner.
One of Mr. St. Clair's mistakes is to postulate two unpalatable
alternatives: at one pole indictable crimes, at the other unlimited
congressional discretion.209 But there is a median possibility which
in fact was the choice of the Framers: Impeachment would be both
limited and noncriminal. In noticing that "high crimes and misde-
meanors" had a "technical meaning too limited," the Framers ex-
hibited awareness that the words had a "limited" content defined
by the English practice at the adoption of the Constitution. As we
have seen, they repeatedly referred to the established categories, name-
ly, subversion of the Constitution, abuse of power, neglect of duty
-all nonindictable and limited offenses..2 10 To be sure, these are
broad categories, but no more so than many standards employed by
the law, such as restraint of trade, the care of an ordinary prudent
man, or due process itself.
The English categories expressed the evils at which the Framers
squarely aimed; Mr. St. Clair's attempts to explain them away are
a grasping at straws. Consider his argument based on the rejection
of "maladministration" as an impeachable offense in favor of "high
crimes and misdemeanors" in an effort to show that "impeachment
was designed to deal exclusively with indictable criminal conduct."
"Thus," he states, the Framers "manifested their intention to narrow
the scope of impeachable offenses." 21' Without doubt the phrase
"high crimes and misdemeanors" is narrower than "maladministra-
tion," which might include minor examples of mismanagement. But
rejection of "maladministration" does not spell a "narrowing" of
"high crimes and misdemeanors"; we need to look to "high crimes
208. Id. at 86-90.
209. St. Clair 14.
210. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 70, 89.
211. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 30-31, 32. He argues that Gouverneur Morris' ar-
gument for retention of Mason's proposed "maladministration" on the ground that
"it will not be put in force & can do no harm-an election of every four years
will prevent maladministration," 2 FARRAND, supra note 89, at 550, "expressed the
will of the Convention," St. Clair 31, notwithstanding that the Convention then pro-
ceeded to reject Morris' plea for "maladministration" and substituted "high crimes
and misdemeanors." Such analysis is sloppy.
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and misdemeanors" itself for the content the phrase had in both par-
liamentary practice and the eyes of the Framers. Each of the categories
recognized by the Founders, such as "abuse of power" and "neglect
of duty," was a category at English law of "high crimes and misde-
meanors" and each represents a form of maladministration, that is,
"'improper management of public affairs." Thus "maladministration"
within the parameters of "high crimes and misdemeanors" undoubt-
edly was to be impeachable. For this we have Madison's testimony.
'Referring to displacement "from office [of] a man whose merits
require that he should be continued in it" (wanton discharge), Madi-
son stated that the President "will be impeachable by this House,
before the Senate, for such an act of maladministration.
' 21 2
Equally without merit is Mr. St. Clair's assertion that "[t]he Con-
vention rejected all noncriminal definitions of impeachable offenses.
* . . Terms like 'malpractice,' 'neglect of duty' . . . and 'misconduct'
were all considered and discarded." 213 In fact, however, "malprac-
tice" and "neglect of duty" were considered and "agreed to" at an
early stage; 21 4 later, when the issue was whether the President should
be impeachable, Franklin urged that impeachment was needed when
the President's "misconduct should deserve it."2165 This was not put
to a vote and it was not "rejected." Instead, the Framers adopted
"high crimes and misdemeanors," which included "neglect of duty"
and serious "misconduct" in office, as the Framers were well aware.
Since the generic "high crimes and misdemeanors" embraced those
particulars, there was no need to spell them out; an omission to
do so cannot therefore be twisted into a "rejection" of the particulars.
Next Mr. St. Clair scoffs at the Framers' comments on impeach-
able categories because they antedated the Convention's decision on
the "nature of the executive branch." Hence there was "no clear
concept of who would be impeached." 216 But by July 20, the date
of the early remarks, it had been settled, in Madison's words, that
"the Executive Magistracy . . . was to be administered by a single
man." 217 The later discussions avouched by Mr. St. Clair merely have
reference to the several methods of electing the President; they did
not alter impeachability of that "single man.121 8 By his own admis-
212. 1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 517 (1789) (page running head "History of Congress").
213. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 31.
214. 1 FARRAND, supra note 89, at 88.
215. 2 id. at 65.
216. St. Clair 27-30.
217. 2 FARRAND 66.
218. St. Clair 28-29.
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sion, the last discussion of the subject on September 8 was Mason's
admonition that provision must be made for "great and dangerous
offenses," such as the nonindictable subversion of the Constitution,
which led directly to the adoption of the phrase "high crimes and
misdemeanors." 2' 10 Moreover, when the Founders referred to the
earlier categories in the several Ratification Conventions, they clearly
demonstrated their satisfaction with the noncriminal content of "high
crimes and misdemeanors"; and, as we have seen, Madison listed
still other nonindictable offenses in the First Congress.
To illustrate "the opposition of the Framers to the abuse in the
English tradition," Mr. St. Clair points to their proscription of bills
of attainder, corruption of blood, and narrow definition of treason.220
These examples demonstrate, however, that the Framers well knew
how to reject undesirable practices. The fact that they defined trea-
son narrowly and left "high crimes and misdemeanors" untouched
indicates that they were content to follow English practice in "high
crimes and misdemeanors,"1221 as their references to the several cat-
egories confirm. Mr. St. Clair further argues that the treason and
attainder examples "express the deep commitment to due process
which permeates the Constitution. This due process would be emas-
culated if the impeachment process were not limited to indictable
offenses." 222 Since it is the intention of the Framers that Mr. St.
Clair purports to seek, we must view due process as they did. For
them due process merely demanded conformity with the procedure
required by the law of the land. Hamilton gave, as an example, "due
process of law, that is by indictment or presentment of good and law-
ful men, and trial and conviction in consequence." 223 Charges filed
219. Id. at 30-31.
220. Id. at 14, 16-17, 40.
221. A striking example of the Founders' assumption that English law would be
applicable unless barred is exhibited by the First Congress' prohibition of resort to
"benefit of clergy" as an exemption from capital punishment, an exemption first af-
forded by the common law to the clergy and then to such of the laity as could
read. R. BERCER, supra note 68, at 76.
St. Clair also argues that because the "pardon power is explicitly excluded for im-
peachment convictions" it "can only be understood as a reaction to and rejection
of the English political impeachments." The exclusion proves exactly the contrary: The
fact that a pardon can not save one convicted on impeachment shows an intention to
preserve impeachments of whatever nature. The exception for pardons derived from
English history and practice, when the pardon of the Earl of Danby by Charles II,
after his impeachment, blew up a storm. As a result, the Act of Settlement fashioned
a partial bar to such pardons; and a remark by George Nicholas in the Virginia
Ratification Convention shows that the Founders were aware of this history: "Few
ministers will ever run the risk of being impeached, when they know the King cannot
protect them by a pardon." R. BERcFR, supra note 68, at 45, 55 n.7, 101.
222. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 17.
223. 4 A. HAMILTON, WORKs 237 (Lodge ed. 1904). The "due process" of the Fifth
Amendment, said Charles Curtis, incontrovertibly "meant a procedural due process, which
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by the House and trial by the Senate under the ascertainable law
were all that due process required in the eyes of the Framers.
Still another of Mr. St. Clair's contributions to history is his dis-
missal of the "impeachments between 1621 and 1715 [which] had as
their main purpose the achievement of parliamentary supremacy."
Indeed, "some individuals were impeached merely because they . . .
were favorites of the King and hence rivals of the Parliament in
settling State policy." 22 4 Shades of the dissolute Duke of Buckinghaml
His "boundless influence over both James I and Charles I," said
Professor Chafee, "was one of the greatest calamities which ever hit
the English throne," and he, Macaulay stated, illustrates why "fa-
vorites have always been highly odious."225 Such impeachments, ac-
cording to Mr. St. Clair, "distorted" the process in order to achieve
"parliamentary supremacy," which he labels an "abuse."22  This is
a hair raising description of a process that halted the tide of mon-
archical absolutism which was sweeping over Europe. Mr. St. Clair's
conclusion that this aspect of impeachment was opposed by the
Framers as "an abuse in the English tradition" 227 reveals unfamiliarity
with the fact that for them that parliamentary struggle was the cradle
of liberty.228 In truth, their expressions of distrust of "favorites," their
hatred of Stuart absolutism 2 2 9 which had engendered the great Eng-
lish impeachments, their abiding faith in the legislature2 , 0 which led
the Framers zo give it a "bridle" on the executive, their repeated
references to impeachable offenses such as subversion of the Con-
stitution, abuse of power, and even to the giving of "bad advice" by
Ministers to the Crown 231 that emerged from this struggle for parlia-
mentary supremacy, demonstrate that the Framers, far from regarding
these as "abuses" and "distortions" to be repudiated, adopted them
could be easily ascertained from almost any law book." Curtis, Review and Majority
Rule, in SUPREME COURT & SUPREME LAW 177 (E. Cahn ed. 1954). The shift to "sub-
stantive" due process began in the late 19th century. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMtERicAN
SUPREME COURT 128-32 (1960); Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, in THE
CONSTTUTION RECONSIDERE 167 (C. Read ed. 1938).
224. St. Clair 12-13, 15.
225. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 72.
226. St. Clair, supra note 141, at 13, 16.
227. Id. at 16.
228. "The privileges of the House of Commons, for which the people had fought
in the seventeenth century . . . [they] held to be synonymous with their liberty ....
J. CLIVE, MACAULAY 124-25 (1973).
229. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 5 n.9, 99 n.215, 101 n.228.
230. Justice Brandeis referred to the deep-seated conviction of the English and
American people that they "must look to representative assemblies for the protection
of their liberties." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 294-95 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
The constitutional provision for impeachment is one piece of evidence for that view.
231. R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 71-72, 71n.91, 89.
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en bloc in order to save the nascent democracy from executive usur-
pations and excesses. Mr. St. Clair's reading of history underlines
anew the wisdom of Pope's injunction-"Drink deep, or taste not the
Pierian spring."
D. Selectivity: Other Examples
Let me close with a few additional examples of discriminatory se-
lectivity which a lawyer employs to acquit a client but which hardly
comport with the duty of one who professes to give a faithful his-
torical account. After alluding to treason and bribery, Mr. St. Clair
states, "Other crimes for which impeachments were brought included
the misappropriation of government funds, participation in various
plots against the government . . . and voicing religious beliefs pro-
hibited by the laws." By the First Amendment, he continues, the
Constitution "specifically rejected the English precedents of impeach-
ing individuals for their religious beliefs.1 23 2 From this one might
conclude that he had exhausted the roster of impeachable offenses.
Where is mention of subversion of the Constitution, abuse of power,
betrayal of trust, and neglect of duty, which were impeachable of-
fenses in England, and to which the Founders adverted?
Again, Mr. St. Clair quotes Erskine May for the proposition that
"impeachments are reserved for extraordinary crimes and extraordi-
nary offenders, ' 233 but he neglects to add May's statement that "[i]m-
peachments by the Commons, for high crimes and misdemeanors
beyond the reach of the [criminal] law . . . might still be regarded
as an ultimate safeguard of public liberty."234 Throughout, Mr. St.
Clair plays a tattoo on the fact that impeachment was a proceeding
"for great men and great causes." 235 Would he read out of the Con-
stitution the express provision for impeachment of "all civil officers"
who are not "great men"? Is not the President a "great man" by
any standard? Then too, "great offenses" for the Founders were the
impeachable offenses that they enumerated, for which we cannot now
substitute a new version supplied by defense counsel.
Consider finally Mr. St. Clair's selection from Edmund Burke at
the trial of Warren Hastings:
232. St. Clair. supra note 141, at 12.
233. Id. at 9.
234. T.E. MAY, PARLIAMENTARY PRAcricE 39 (17th ed. 1964).
235. See, e.g., St. Clair 9.
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We say, then, not only that he governed arbitrarily, but corruptly
.. that is to say, that he was a giver and receiver of bribes....
In short, money is the beginning, the middle, and the end of every
kind of act done by Mr. Hastings.236
The emphasis on "money" is apt to overshadow that Hastings was
charged with governing "arbitrarily," the classic impeachable offense,
and that Burke's accusations reached far deeper than "bribery." In
his opening statement before the Lords he stated,
It is by this tribunal that statesmen who abuse their power ...
are tried .. .not upon the niceties of a narrow [criminal] juris-
prudence, but upon the enlarged and solid principles of mo-
rality.237  o
Observe that Burke, the hero of the Founders for his defense of the
American revolt, emphasized that "abuse of power" was not to be
tried by the narrow principles of criminal law. And he concluded,
"I impeach Warren Hastings of high crimes and misdemeanors. I
impeach him in the name of the Commons . . . whose trust he has
betrayed ... .1,238 To ignore these statements while concentrating,
attention on "bribery" is to deal in halftruths and to stray from candor.
Enough has been set out to expose Mr. St. Clair's cavalier treat-
ment of history; and though it is tempting to invoke the Latin
maxim, so often applied by the courts-false in one thing, false in
everything-I prefer rather to forego analysis of the rest of the 61-
page St. Clair memorandum in order to spare the reader a need-
lessly wearisome and tedious journey. Against this background it is
sheer effrontery to say, as does Mr. St. Clair,
[a]ny analysis that broadly construes the power to impeach and
convict can be reached only by reading Constitutional authori-
ties selectively, by lifting specific historical precedents out of their
precise historical context, by disregarding the plain meaning and
accepted definition of technical, legal terms-in short, by placing
a subjective gloss on the history of impeachment that results in
permitting the Congress to do whatever it deems most politic. 39
In conclusion, Mr. St. Clair has resolutely closed his eyes to ad-
verse facts throughout, to the impact of the American separation
236. Id. at 14.
237. 7 E. BURKE, supra note 140, at 11, 14.
238. Id. at 267.
239. St. Clair 60.
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of removal on impeachment from criminal trial by jury of "all crim-
inal prosecutions" if, as he argues, the removal proceeding must be
regarded as criminal in nature. "Historical reconstruction," said a
distinguished English historian, Sir Herbert Butterfield, "must at
least account for the evidence that is discrepant, and must explain
how the rejected testimony came to exist."2 40 Judges too require
lawyers to meet the arguments of opposing counsel. When Mr. St.
Clair neglects to do so and wraps himself in the cloak of pseudo-history,
he lays himself open to the suspicion that he is not so much engaged
in honest reconstruction of history as in propaganda whose sole pur-
pose is to influence public opinion in favor of a client who is under
grave suspicion. An "acquittal so obtained," said Macaulay, "cannot
be pleaded in bar of the judgment of history."
241
240. H. BuI-TERFI.ELD, supra note 136, at 225.
241. T. MACAULAY, supra note 127, at 516.
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